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Abstract 
 
Previous studies suggested that a monopoly durable goods seller can use leasing to effectively 
avoid the time-inconsistent problem raised by Coase Conjecture. This paper extends those 
previous works by examining the monopoly seller’s selling and leasing strategy for a special type 
of durable good --- software. We look at a software vendor that can sell (at a posted price) or 
lease his product where as a lesser he guarantees that the lessees will always have the latest 
version of the software. We address some of the specific issues of implementing the selling 
and/or leasing policies at the packaged software market, including the impact of network 
externality, upgrade compatibility, and commitment on pricing in a dynamic environment. We 
show that by properly defining their pricing structure, software vendors can segment the market 
and second-degree price discriminate the consumers. We also demonstrate how software vendors 
can manage the trade-offs of selling and leasing to achieve a higher profit as well as the 
corresponding welfare effect on the consumers.  
 
Key Words: Software licensing, Coarse Conjecture, Price discrimination, Network externality, 
Commitment, Upgrade, Compatibility, Risk. 
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1. Introduction 
 
 Software has been traditionally sold as a property. Users pay a fee for the perpetual 
proprietary license to use it for the whole life cycle. The development of information technology, 
especially the Internet, has unleashed unprecedented levels of process innovation as well as 
product innovation in the software industry. The way software is sold is also changed. Many 
software publishers such as Sun, Oracle, and Microsoft have expanded their software distribution 
methods with a new subscription licensing policy, which converts the purchase of software to a 
subscription to the service.  
With the advent of this subscription licensing model, a software vendor has expanded 
choices to distribute his products, including the traditional perpetual licensing policy in which 
software is sold as a commodity; a pure subscription model that leases the software as a service; 
or a third choice that is a hybrid model that sells and leases the software simultaneously. This 
paper compares the three licensing policies offered in terms of pricing, vendor profit, and 
consumer surplus.  
Software can be used for a period of time without replacement, though its value may 
depreciate. In this sense, it is a kind of durable goods. There are some special characteristics that 
differentiate software from the conventional durable goods such as books and automobiles, 
namely,  
(i), software cannot be resold or appropriated because of intellectual property rights. There are no 
other sources of getting a license except the original vendor, the retailers, or service providers. A 
second-hand market like that for used cars therefore does not exist for software;  
 (ii), as an information good, software has strong economy of scale in production—it is costly to 
create the first copy but has negligible marginal cost to produce additional copies; 
(iii), with the development of information technology, it is easy to improve the value of already 
installed software through upgrades without interfering with the original customization;  
 (iv), the use of software has a strong network externality effect (Katz and Shapiro, 1986). The 
value of using particular software increases with the number of its adopters. 
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Among the above special characteristics of software products, (i) to (iii) can be considered as a 
simplified version of the traditional durable goods selling or leasing problem; however, 
characteristic (iv) complicates the problem and has never been formally addressed. Therefore we 
cannot apply all the established conclusions about the physical durable goods to compare 
software licensing policies. This paper will fill in the gap and contribute to the theory of durable 
good by examining the impact of network externality on the monopoly seller’s selling and 
leasing strategies. 
Besides the above differences, software compatibility and related varying network effects 
in software upgrades further complicate the consumers and vendor’s decisions. Software is 
usually designed to be compatible with previous versions (backward compatibility) due to the 
network effect from users of the old version software, while forward compatibility (compatible 
with future versions) is hard to achieve before the new version comes out. The stronger a 
network effect exists in software adoption, the higher incentive it gives the monopolist software 
vendor to lower the price of the first version software, so that he can boost the market share, 
increase network externality for future version software, and sell it at a higher price in the future.  
By addressing the specific issues related to implementing the licensing policies raised 
above, such as, compatibility, network externality and commitment problem, this paper 
investigates how a monopolist software vendor uses different licensing policies and pricing 
menus to segment consumers based on their sensitivity to product quality and realize second-
price discrimination. Considering consumers’ self-selection behavior, we will also study the 
optimal licensing policy of the software vendor—selling or leasing his products exclusively, or 
adopting a hybrid strategy of both sales and leases and propose managerial insights. Therefore 
this study extends the previous studies of Padmanabhan et al. (1997), Fudenberg and Tirole 
(1998) and Ellison and Fudenberg (2000), which focused on a special case of our model for 
insights on durable goods selling and excessive software upgrade.  
The most important result of the study is that in a durable market, leasing strategy can be 
used to resolve the time-inconsistent problem, as suggested by Coase (1972), Bulow (1982) and 
the others, but not in all cases. Specifically, in the software market considered in this paper, 
leasing can still make the seller commit to future prices, by definition, but it does not solve the 
time-inconsistent problem in the sense that the maximal profit for the seller can be lower than 
that with commitment. This is not the case in previous studies, which found that leasing “can 
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achieve all the standard results of a nondurable monopolist” (Bulow 1982). This surprising result 
is due to the strong network effect in software market.  
Leasing puts a constraint of constant rent over time, thus it helps the vendor commit on a 
high future price at a cost of losing some market share in the current period. On the other hand, 
without the constraint on selling prices for different versions of software, the vendor can use a 
lower first period price to strengthen the network effect aiming for a higher profit in the future. 
However, selling lacks the ability of making commitment; therefore the vendor may not be able 
to reap the benefit of the network effect. Those are the trade-offs between selling and leasing 
faced with a monopolist software vendor with the presence of network externality. When 
network externality is large enough, leasing may not be a dominant strategy for the software 
vendor. Instead, he may adopt a pure selling or hybrid strategy to achieve the optimal profit. That 
is, when network externality is taken into account, leasing may not always achieve the optimal 
profit as shown in previous studies (Coase 1972, Swan 1977, Bulow 1982). This hypothesis has 
been supported by the results from the model. We show that because leasing strategy forgoes 
some market share for the ability of committing on second period price, with the presence of 
network externality, profit under pure leasing strategy may be lower than that of a nondurable 
monopolist. Therefore leasing can only achieve constrained optima, and it addresses the time-
inconsistent problem at the cost of losing market share and reducing consumer surplus.   
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents a review of the relevant 
literature. Section 3 describes the model of consumer choices and firm strategies. Sub-section 3.1 
- 3.4 presents the equilibria of pure selling and pure leasing strategies under the five models of 
different market configurations. Section 4 concludes with suggestions for future research. 
 
2. Literature Review 
 
Many economics and marketing researchers have examined the ways of selling durable 
goods. Coase (1972) raised the conjecture that a monopolist durable goods seller could not sell 
the goods at the monopolist price (time-inconsistent problem) because rational and patient 
consumers would anticipate the future price drop and delay their purchase. Hence Coase 
proposed leasing (rather than selling) durable goods as a way to solve the commitment problem. 
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Stokey (1981) and Gul et al. (1986) have rigorously verified this conjecture, followed by Bulow 
(1982)’s conclusion that leasing can achieve the optimal profit for a monopolist non-durable 
good seller, therefore it dominates selling. Some recent works, however, challenged the 
assumptions of the Coase model and proposed conditions under which leasing can co-exist with 
selling as the optimal strategy for a monopolist durable good seller. For example, Bucovetsky 
and Chilton (1986), proposed threat of entry as a reason for the monopolist to mix selling and 
leasing; Desai and Purohit (1998) find that leasing does not dominate selling in all cases if the 
depreciation of the durable goods is taken into account, and that a mixed strategy is optimal 
when the depreciation rates differ between selling and leasing. We adopt a setting similar to the 
traditional Coase Conjecture where a monopolist software vendor sells or leases his product to 
the market. We want to examine the impact of network externality alone on the vendor’s selling 
and leasing strategies ruling out the impact of competition and product depreciation. 
Among the studies address the distribution strategy of packaged software, Choudhary et 
al. (1998) study the problem of renting software from a different point of view, arguing that 
renting software in the first period to otherwise later adopters can increase the seller's profit. 
Another related stream of literature concerns product upgrades. This paper discusses the upgrade 
problem from a different perspective from that of Padmanabhan et al. (1997) and Fudenberg and 
Tirole (1998), both of which suggested that product upgrade as a way to deal with demand 
uncertainty. Padmanabhan et al. (1997) suggest that when a monopolist seller can choose both 
prices and qualities over two periods but is uncertain about the initial exogenous demand, 
upgrades come from the underprovision of introductory quality, which signals high externality in 
the market. Fudenberg and Tirole (1998) study the pricing of a new generation of durable goods 
depending on the information the monopolist has about its past customers. Our paper 
endogenizes the demand for goods of different qualities and distributions. The current paper 
studies intertemporal product quality improvement, which differs from vertical product 
differentiation in a static state, as studied by Mussa and Rosen (1978), Moorthy (1984), and 
Bhargava and Choudhary (2001), among others. 
Our work also draws on the literature on markets that involve either direct or indirect 
network effects. Katz and Shapiro (1994) categorize such markets and identify the issues firms 
and consumers face while dealing with these markets. Farrell and Saloner (1986) investigate how 
the installed base for such products interacts with a firm’s incentive to innovate and evaluate the 
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welfare implications of certain strategies that firms might adopt. Similar issues are also 
considered by Katz and Shapiro (1985), Farrell and Saloner (1985), and Choi (1994). Ellison and 
Fundenberger (2000) examined software issues incorporating network externality and they found 
that the network effect causes excessive upgrades above the social optimal level. That paper is 
the closest to our work, but they did not consider leasing or selling, which is the traditional 
Coase Conjecture problem and also has great practical implications. 
We investigate whether leasing can solve the time-inconsistent problem in “Coase 
conjecture” for special durable goods like software, that is, whether web-based leases will 
become the dominant way of delivering software. We discuss leasing and selling software in a 
monopolist context, trying to explain the motivation for different strategies. We analyze the 
optimal software distribution strategies and discuss the impact on users: (1) to provide insights 
into Independent Software Vendors (ISVs); (2) to explain some of the empirical observations 
regarding software licensing policies; (3) to examine the differences in strategies regarding 
software and other durable products; and (4) to understand the effect of the selling and leasing 
strategies on the consumer welfare and social welfare. 
 
3.  Model 
We model the intertemporal consumer behavior and the firm's strategic licensing policy 
with a two-period model. We introduce our model by first detailing the assumptions about the 
players—consumers and the monopoly software vendor (the ISV). 
Assume that the consumers of the software product have the following form of net utility: 
U (q, x, p;θ ) = θ q + e x – p,            (1) 
where p and q are the price paid and the quality of the software product, respectively; x 
represents the population of the adopters of the product; and θ and e are the intensity of the 
quality preference and the network externality, respectively. Software “quality” includes such 
dimensions as speed, compatibility with available operating systems, functionalities, user 
interface, ease of learning, warranty, service and support and other characteristics that affect the 
users’ valuation of the product. Consumers are heterogeneous in their quality preferenceθ but are 
homogeneous in their sensitivity to network externality e. Consumers are indexed by their 
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quality preferenceθ and are uniformly distributed on the support [0, 1]. Similar utility functional 
forms can be found in Mussa and Rosen (1978), Salant (1989), and Ellison and Fudenberg 
(2000). Measures of quality include speed, compatibility, functionalities, user interface, ease of 
learning, warranty, service and support, etc.  
The ISV can provide the software to the market through one-time sales, leases, and sales of 
upgrades. Assume that there are two versions of the software. Version I, with quality q1, is 
released at the beginning of period 1. Because of ongoing development, an upgraded version 
with quality q2 is released at the beginning of period 2, and q2 > q1. In order to simplify the 
problem, we assume there the second version software quality is certain and leave out the 
discussion about a stochastic q2 to other studies. 
To cut down on the number of cases under consideration we assume that 1 2 1( )q q qβ≥ ⋅ − , so 
that it is optimal for consumers with higher quality preferenceθ to consume in period 1 as 
opposed to waiting until period 2. Similar to Assumption 1 in Fudenberg and Tirole (1998), this 
assumption only excludes very large improvements between the two versions, but considerably 
simplifies the analysis. 
We study the most common case of software production in terms of compatibility: the new 
version software is backward compatible but not forward compatible with the previous version. 
That is, this software system can successfully use interfaces and data format from earlier 
versions of the system, but it is not designed in such a way that it fits with planned future 
versions of itself. Hence, consumers who upgrade or buy the new version software can use new 
features of the latest version and enjoy the network externality from the installed base—the users 
of the old version of the software as well as adopters of the new version; but those consumers 
who continue to use the old version software cannot use the new features and their network 
externality will only come from the users of the same version. 
The ISV sets the selling price p1, the upgrade price pu, the second-period selling price p2 for 
the new version, and the per period rent pr at the beginning of period 1. In the lease contract, the 
vendor is committed to keep the rent, pr, the same during the two periods. Since the software 
vendor would like to attract the users to purchase in the first period and can not tell whether a 
buyer in the second period owns the first version, he can not charge an upgrade price pu higher 
than the sale price of version II, p2; that is, pu ≤ p2.  
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Figure 1: Consumer Strategies 
  
Figure 1 depicts all the available consumer choices. Those consumers who adopt version 
I in the first period have the option of upgrading to the new version in period 2 at a cost of pu, but 
the consumers who enter the lease contract in the first period will use the new version software 
without any additional charge besides the per period rent. Those consumers who are inactive in 
the first period will have the choice of purchasing version II or not in the second period. 
For a consumer of typeθ  who purchases the version I software in the first period, the 
total discounted value can be expressed as 
1 0 1 2 2 1 1( ) ( , , ; ) max{ ( , , ; ), ( , ,0; )}B uV U q x p U q x p U q xθ θ β θ θ= +            (2) 
where ( )Bq θ  is solved from 2 1 1( ( ), , ; ) ( , ,0; ).B uU q x p U q xθ θ θ=  
The value of the buyer as in Equation (2) is given by the sum of the net utility for the 
users in period 1, as defined in (1), and the discounted value from the second period, when the 
buyer can decide to upgrade the software or to keep using version I. The discount factor is β  ∈ 
[0, 1]. Here x0 denotes the adoption population of version I of the software in the first period 
(including both the buyers and the lessees), x1 denotes the adoption population that continue 
using version I in period 2 (those buyers in period 1 who do not upgrade to new version), and x2 
is the number of users using version II in period 2 (including both period 1buyers who upgrade 
and the lessees). 
Upgrade to version II 
Retain version I 
Auto upgrade to version II 
Buy version II 
Inactive 
 
Buy version I 
Lease version I 
Inactive 
Period 1 
ISV provides Version I 
Period 2 
ISV provides Version II 
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After entering a lease contract, the lessee receives continuous streams of product with 
updates for a fixed annual payment. The value for entering the lease contract in the first period is 
  1 0 2 2( ) ( , , ; ) ( , , ; )L r rV U q x p U q x pθ θ β θ= + .         (3) 
This value is the sum of her net utility of using the latest version of the software over the 
two periods. According to the contract, she has to pay the rent pr every period during the lease
1
. 
Finally, the expected discounted value for a consumer inactive in the first period is  
2 2 2( ) max{ ,0}IV q ex pθ β θ= + − .               (4)  
where ( )Iq θ  is solved from 2 2( ( ), , ; ) 0.IU q x pθ θ =  
If a consumer cannot get a positive net utility from buying the first version of the 
software or entering the lease contract, she will be inactive in the first period and wait to buy the 
second version of the software in period 2 if her utility of buying q2 would be higher than the 
price p2. 
For a consumer with quality preferenceθ , the expected total discounted value from using 
the software over the two periods is  
   ( ) max{ ( ), ( ), ( )}B L IV V V Vθ θ θ θ= .     (5) 
Here we focus our attention on the consumers' buy-or-lease decision given the vendor’s licensing 
policy.  
To compare the licensing strategies for the software vendor, consumers and social impact 
under the various combinations of market conditions, we will solve the market equilibria under 
the pure selling, pure leasing and hybrid strategies for each of the following eight models 
(detailed model setup will be presented below). From the comparisons of the models, we will 
show the impact of network externality on firm licensing policy selection, its market share, profit 
and consumer decision and surplus.  
 The software vendor may be able to use the hybrid strategy to better price discriminate 
the consumers and extract their surplus. Yet consumers may also benefit from more choices to 
realize the value of using the software product. Thus it is unclear what effect it will bring to 
consumer surplus and social welfare.  
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 With Commitment Without commitment 
Without network externality 
3.1: Model 1  
Benchmark 
3.2: Model 2 
without commitment 
 
With network externality 
3.3 Model 3 
With externality 
 
3.4 Model 4 
without commitment and with 
externality 
Table 1. Model Structure of the Paper. 
 
3.1 Benchmark Model - No externality, with commitment 
In the benchmark model, we consider the case where there is no externality (e = 0), and 
the seller can commit to pre-announced second period prices, i.e., pu and p2. 
3.1.1 Pure selling 
If the software vendor decides not to lease the software but only sell it, a consumer of 
type θ decides to buy it or not in period 1. A consumer evaluates her benefits from each of the 
two choices to make the first period decision: ( ) max{ ( ), ( )}B IV V Vθ θ θ= . There exists a tradeoff 
between buying and waiting. If the consumer buys the software, she will use it from period 1 and 
keeps the option of upgrading or not in period 2, while a consumer who waits to buy in period 2 
cannot use it in period 1 but will keep her option of buying the new version or not in the next 
period open.  
Based on (2) and (4), the discounted total value of a first period buyer is:  
1 0 1 2 2 1 1
1 1 2 1
1 2 1 2 1
( ) ( , , ; ) [max{ ( , , ; ), ( , ,0; )}]
(1 ) /( )
( ) ( ) /( )
B u
u
u u
V U q x p U q x p U q x
q p p q q
q q p p p q q
θ θ β θ θ
θ β θ
θ β β θ
= +
+ − ≤ −
= 
+ − + ≥ −
, 
and that of a waiter in period 1 is: 
                                                                                                                                                             
1
 Assume the penalty for breaching the contract is large enough to prohibit deviators. 
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2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
( ) max{ ( , , ; ),0} max{ ,0}
( ) /
0 /
IV U q x p q p
q p p q
p q
θ β θ θ
β θ θ
θ
= = −
− ≥
= 
≤
. 
Therefore a user have four choices over the two periods, buy version I in period 1 and upgrade to 
version II in period 2 (BU), buy version I in period 1 and keep using it in period 2 (BH), wait to 
buy version II in period 2 (IB), and inactive in both periods (II). Since 1q qβ≥ ⋅Δ , we have the 
consumer market segmentation as described in Lemma 1 and shown in Figure 2.  
Lemma 1: Consumers with quality preference θ  ∈ [0, θ 0] are inactive; those with θ ∈ (θ 0, θ 1] 
will wait to buy version II in the second period; those with θ ∈ (θ 1, θ 2] buy version I in the first 
period buy do not upgrade in the second period when version II is available; consumers with θ  
∈ (θ 2, 1] will always use the latest version of the software during the two periods. 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Potential Market Segmentation under pure selling. 
The cutoff values are:  
2 1 2
0 1 2
2 1 2 2 1
, , .
(1 )
upp p p
q q q q q
β
θ θ θ
β β
−
= = =
+ − −
           (6) 
Taking the consumers’ choices into account, the software vendor optimizes discounted 
total profit over the two periods: 
 
1 2
1 2 1 1 2
, ,
2
max ( , , ) ( )
0, 0, 0, 0
. .
u
u BU u BH IB
p p p
BU BH IB II
u
p p p x p p x p x p
x x x x
s t
p p
β βΠ = ⋅ + + ⋅ + ⋅
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥

≥
 (7) 
where ix  (i = BU, BH, and IB) represents the demand from each consumer segment, and can be 
calculated by the difference of the cutoff values in each segment:  
2 2 11 ,BU BHx xθ θ θ= − = − , and 1 0.IBx θ θ= −      (8) 
Plug (6) and (8) into (7), the optimal prices are 
0 1 θ
0 
θ1 θ2 
IB BH BU II 
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* * *1 2 2 1
1 2
(1 ) ( )
, ,
2 2 2
u
q q q q
p p p
β+ −
= = =     (9) 
Given (6)-(9), the optimal total profit of the software vendor in Model 1 is:  
* 1 2( )
4
q qβ+
Π = ,     (10) 
The equilibrium consumer segmentation is given by 
1
2
BUx = . 
Therefore it is optimal for the software vendor to sell only to high-end users and to price 
out buy-and –holder users as well as the opportunistic consumers who wait to buy in period 2. 
Although consumers who purchase the software in the first period do have the option of not 
upgrading in period 2, the option has no value here since the prices are set such that all of them 
will chose to upgrade.  
Consumer surplus and social welfare are 
* *1 2 1 2( ) 3( ),   
8 8
q q q q
CS W
β β+ +
= = .    (11) 
respectively.  
 
3.1.2 Pure leasing 
If the software vendor chooses not to sell the software but only allows leasing the 
product, a consumer has only two choices over the two periods, that is, to lease or not to lease. 
Her total value will be ( ) max{ ( ), ( )}L IV V Vθ θ θ= . From (3), a lessee’s total value over the two 
periods is: 
1 0 2 2 1 2( ) ( , , ; ) ( , , ; ) ( ) (1 )L r r rV U q x p U q x p q q pθ θ β θ θ β β= + = + − + , 
and the value for someone who does not lease is ( ) 0IV θ = . 
 The consumers are segmented into two groups, consumers with 
1 2( ) /(1 )
rp
q q
θ
β β
≥
+ +
will 
lease, otherwise will stay inactive. 
 The vendor will choose an optimal leasing price to maximize total profit: 
 
max ( ) (1 )
. . 0
r
r L r
p
L
p x p
s t x
βΠ = ⋅ +
≥
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 Solving the above maximization problem, we can see the optimal leasing price 
is * 1 2
( )
2(1 )
r
q q
p
β
β
+
=
+
, which is the same as the total expenses of the buy-and-upgrade users equally 
allocated to each period.  
The software vendor receives the same profit as in the pure selling scenario * 1 2
( )
4
q qβ+
Π = . 
Half of the consumers will lease and the other half will not.  
Compare the equilibria under pure selling and pure leasing, we can see that the ISV is 
indifferent to either strategy. Consumer segmentations are also identical. For any consumer, the 
total discounted payment to the ISV is also the same as in the pure selling scenario. The only 
difference is that under pure leasing, a consumer pays same leasing price in the two periods, 
while under pure selling, the first period purchasing price and the upgrade price can be different. 
In particular, when the quality increase is not too large 1(1 )q qβΔ < + , a myopic consumer can be 
easily enticed by the lease contract with a lower per-period rent than the purchase price in period 
1. 
Since the ISV is indifferent to the pure selling and pure leasing strategy, all the prices, 
allocations and profits will be the same in a hybrid market. Consumers are segmented into two 
parts, with half of the consumers indifferent with respect to lease or buy and upgrade and the 
other half is inactive in both periods. 
3.2 Model 2 --- No externality, no commitment  
The above benchmark model assumes that the seller is able to commit to the second 
period upgrade and selling prices. To see the effect of this assumption, we look at the software 
vendor’s decision on whether to deviate from the committed prices, i.e., pu and p2 at period 2. At 
period 2, the software vendor’s profit function is:  
2
2 2
,
max ( , ) )
u
u IB BU u
p p
p p x p x pΠ = +  
and the optimal prices are:  
* *2 2 2 1
2
( )
,
4 2 2
u
q q q q
p p
−
= < = . 
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The upgrade price is the same as the commitment price but the selling price is lower than the 
committed one. It is in this sense that the optimal decision in the benchmark model is not time 
consistent: given the chance to reconsider its decision, the seller would be better off to change 
the second period sell price.  
Therefore, the seller’s commitment is not credible, which is consistent with the 
conjecture by Coase (1972) that rational consumers would anticipate that prices should fall 
down.  In this section, we consider the Nash Equilibrium without commitment, that is, the seller 
cannot commit to pre-announced second period prices pu and p2, unless there is a binding 
contract such as a lease. Since leasing is a way of committing on the second period price, by 
introducing an external constraint, the market equilibrium for leasing will be the same as in the 
benchmark model.  
 
3.2.1 Pure selling 
Given the price of version 1 software, consumers decide whether to buy or not. The 
software vendor sets price of version 2 software and upgrade price at the beginning of period II. 
Then consumers choose to upgrade or not if they have already bought the first version in period 
I, otherwise they choose to buy version 2 or not. 
We solve this two-stage Stackleberg game backward, starting from the consumers and 
software vendor’s decision at the second period, taking the first period outcome as given. In the 
second period, a consumer who has bought the software may or may not upgrade depending on 
her type, the upgrade price and the quality improvement. The utility of the consumer of type θ  
can be expressed as 
2 2 1 1 2 1
1 2 1
2 2 1
( ) max{ ( , , ; ), ( , ,0; )} max{ , }
/( )
/( )
B u u
u
u u
V U q x p U q x q p q
q p q q
q p p q q
θ θ θ θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
= = −
≤ −
= 
− ≥ −
. 
A consumer who has been inactive in period 1 will buy the new version software in the second 
period when her type θ  is greater than the price and quality ratio of the new software. 
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2 2 2 2 2
2 2 2 2
2 2
( ) max{ ( , , ; ),0} max{ ,0}
/
0 /
IV U q x p q p
q p p q
p q
θ θ θ
θ θ
θ
= = −
− ≥
= 
≤
 
The potential market segmentation over the two periods is as depicted in Figure 3, as well 
as in (6) and (8). Thus, a consumer’s strategy in the second period depends on the relative value 
of her type θ  and the two cutoff values 2 2 1/( )up q qθ = −  and 0 2/up qθ = . Given the consumers’ 
strategies, we study the second-period profit maximization problem under the constraints that 
each of the four segments is nonnegative:  
 
2
2 2
,
2
max '( , )
0, 0, 0, 0
. .
0
u
u BU u IB
p p
II IB BH BU
u
p p x p x p
x x x x
s t
p p
Π = +
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥

− ≥
, 
which yields the optimal upgrade price given p1 
* 2 1( )
2
u
q q
p
−
= , * 22 1
12(1 )
q
p p
qβ
=
+
, 1 12
1 2
1
, ,
2 2[(1 ) ] 2(1 )
BU IB II
p p
x x x
q q q
θ
β β β
= = = =
+ − +
 (12) 
The other two constraints require: 
1 1 2
1 1
2 1 2
(1 )
(1 ) (1 ) (1 )
2 2(1 )
q q q
q p
q q q
β β
β
β β
+
+ − ≤ ≤ −
+ −
.  (13) 
Taking the second period equilibrium into consideration, the seller maximizes the total 
profit by deciding the first period price 1p  
1
1max{( ) '}BU BH
p
x x p βΠ = + + Π . 
The optimal price 1p  is subject to inequalities (13) to make sure the assumed market 
segmentation is valid. Since the global optimum falls out of the range, the constrained optimal 
solution is  
1 2
1
1 2
(1 )
(1 )
2 2(1 )
q q
p
q q
β β
β β
+
= −
+ −
, and 0BHx = .   (14) 
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Thus the optimal profit under this pure selling strategy is 
2 2
1 2
2
1 2
(1 )
4(2(1 ) )
S L q q
q q
β β
β β
+
Π =Π −
+ −
. This 
profit is less than the optimal profit in the commitment case, which is also the profit under the 
pure leasing strategy. This is due to the vendor’s inability of making a credible commitment. 
Therefore, leasing is believed to solve this time-inconsistent problem, as suggested in Coarse 
(1967) and other literature. 
 Compared with the pure leasing strategy, consumers are better off since some lower value 
consumers have the opportunity to buy in the second period. The increase in consumer surplus is 
even greater than the loss in the software vendor’s profit, thus social welfare is also higher than 
in the complete commitment case:  
1 2 1 2
2
1 2
(1 ) (5(1 ) 2 )
8(2(1 ) )
S L q q q qCS CS
q q
β β β β
β β
+ + −
= +
+ −
, 1 2 1 2
2
1 2
(1+ ) (3(1 ) 2 )
8(2(1 ) )
S L q q q qW W
q q
β β β β
β β
+ −
= +
+ −
. 
 
3.2.2 Hybrid 
A consumer receives the same benefit from leasing and buy version 1 software and 
upgrade to version 2 in period II, but at different cost structures. Thus, when the total cost of 
leasing the software is slightly lower than that of buy it and upgrade later, all consumers will 
strictly prefer leasing to buying and upgrade the software. Consequently, when the software 
provides both selling and leasing options, those consumers who enter the lease contract will 
cannibalize with the buy-and-upgrade type of consumers. The potential market segmentation for 
the hybrid case is shown in Figure 3. 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Potential Market Segmentation under hybrid strategy. 
The cutoff values are:  
2 1 2 1
0 1 2
2 1 2 2 1
(1 )
, , .
(1 ) ( )
rp p p p p
q q q q q
β β
θ θ θ
β β β
− + −
= = =
+ − −
          (15) 
0 1 θ
0 
θ1 θ2 
IB BH L II 
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When the vendor cannot commit on second period prices, he will set per-period rent pr 
and price for version I software p1 at the beginning of period 1. Consumers then choose to lease, 
buy or remain inactive. At period 2, after the vendor sets price for version II software p2, those 
consumers who have not purchased version I decide to buy new software or not, while those who 
already entered the lease contract receive automatic upgrade at the cost of the rent and those who 
adopters of version I but non-lessees keep using the old version software.  
Solving the two-stage game backward, we consider the vendor’s second period profit 
maximization problem first. 
2
2 2max '( )
. . 0, 0, 0, 0
L r IB
p
II IB BH L
p x p x p
s t x x x x
Π = +
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥
 
which yields the optimal price given p1 and pr  
* 2
2 1
12(1 )
q
p p
qβ
=
+
, 1 1 1
1 2 1 2
(1 )
1 , ,
( ) 2[(1 ) ] 2(1 )
r
L IB II
p p p p
x x x
q q q q q
β
β β β β
+ −
= − = =
− + − +
 (16) 
Taking the second period equilibrium into consideration, the seller maximizes the total 
profit by deciding the first period price 1p  
1
1 1
,
max ( , ) '
0
. .
0
r
r L r BH
p p
L
BH
p p x p x p
x
s t
x
βΠ = + + Π
≥

≥
. 
The constrained optimal solution is  
2 2 2 2
1 1 2 1 1 2 2
1 2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 1 2 2
2 2 2 2 2
1 1 2 2
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 1 2 2
(1 ) ((1 ) )(2(1 ) )
4(1 ) (3 2 ) (1 2 )
(2(1 ) )
2(1 )(4(1 ) (3 2 ) (1 2 ) )
r
q q q q q q q
p
q q q q q q
q q q q
p
q q q q q q
β β β β β β
β β β β β β β
β β β
β β β β β β β β
+ + − + + −
=
+ − + − − + +
+ + −
=
+ + − + − − + +
, 0BHx = .     (17) 
2 3
1 2
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 1 2 2
(1 )
4(4(1 ) (3 2 ) (1 2 ) )
H L q q
q q q q q q
β β
β β β β β β β
+
Π = Π −
+ − + − − + +
 
This profit is smaller than that under the pure leasing strategy. This is due to the vendor’s 
inability of making a credible commitment.  
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 Compared with the pure leasing strategy, consumers are better off and social welfare is 
also higher:  
2 3
1 2
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 1 2 2
2 3
1 2
2 3 2 2 2 2 3 3
1 1 2 1 2 2
3 (1 )
8(4(1 ) (3 2 ) (1 2 ) )
(1 )
8(4(1 ) (3 2 ) (1 2 ) )
S L
S L
q q
CS CS
q q q q q q
q q
W W
q q q q q q
β β
β β β β β β β
β β
β β β β β β β
+
= +
+ − + − − + +
+
= +
+ − + − − + +
. (18) 
Comparing equilibria generated by models 1 and 2, we can see being unable to make 
commitment does decrease the software vendor’s profit and leasing is a way of making 
commitment of second period price. 
 
3.3  Model 3 –with externality, with Commitment 
Software is the type of product that has demonstrated strong network effect through file 
sharing, skill exchange among users, as well as availability of complementary products. 
Therefore a software product with a greater network effect will be valued more by the users. In 
this model, we will consider the network externality effect in addition to the benchmark case, 
that is, the seller can commit to pre-announced second period prices. The market equilibrium 
under the pure leasing policy is expected to be the same as in the benchmark case in Section 
3.1.1. 
3.3.1 Pure leasing 
Suppose that the ISV offers a take-it-or-leave-it lease contract over two periods. If a user 
takes it, she will pay rent pr at the beginning of each period and enjoy the latest version of the 
software without any additional charge. 
The expected discounted value for a consumer who takes the lease is given in (3). Consumers 
with θ  ≥ θ L will get positive utility from the contract. The level of θ L can be obtained by 
solving VL(θ L) = 0. 
   0 2
1 2
(1 ) ( )r
L
p e x x
q q
β β
θ
β
+ − +
=
+
      (19) 
Replacing x0 and x2 by 1 - θ L, we have  
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1 2
(1 )( )
(1 )
r
L
p e
q q e
β
θ
β β
+ −
=
+ − +
          (20) 
Given the consumers' choice, the ISV sets the optimal rent in the lease contract to maximize his 
discounted total profit from the two-period contract: 
   
max ( ) (1 ) (1 )
. . 1
r
r r L
P
L
p p
s t
β θ
θ
Π = + −
≤
.     (21) 
When the network effect does not exceed the quality effect, the value of the 
parameters β , ρ , e, q1, q2 ∈ { 1 2 (1 )q q eβ β+ ≥ + }, we have the optimal price schedule for the 
ISV, which is  
   1 2
2(1 )
l
r
q q
p
β
β
+
=
+
.      (22) 
Here we use the superscript l of the price to represent the equilibrium under the pure leasing 
strategy. Consumers with quality preference 
1 2
1 (1 )
2 2( (1 ) )
L
e
q q e
β
θ θ
β β
+
≥ = −
+ − +
 will enter the lease 
contract. The ISV gets profit 
( )
2
1 2
1 2
( )
( )
4( 1 )
l l
r
q q
p
q q e
β
β β
+
Π =
+ − +
. Total consumer surplus is 
3
1 2
2
1 2
( )
8( (1 ))
l q qCS
q q e
β
β β
+
=
+ − +
. 
3.3.2 Pure selling 
The ISV announces the selling prices of version I software p1 and version II software p2, 
and the upgrade price pu, that rational consumers in period 1 should expect to pay to get version 
II in the next period. At the beginning of period 1, consumers make the decision of whether to 
buy version I. In period 2, those users who have bought version I can choose to upgrade to 
version II at a cost of pu or to keep using version I. Consumers have the same four types of 
choices as in the benchmark case: 
(1) Buy version I in period 1 and upgrade to version II in period 2 — (BU) and gain total 
expected discounted value  
  1 2 0 2 1( ) ( ) ( ) ( )BU uV q q e x x p pθ θ β β β= + + + − + .       (23) 
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(2) Buy version I in period 1 and do not upgrade in period 2 — (BH). The total expected 
discounted value over the two periods is  
1 0 1 1 1( ) ( )BHV q ex p q exθ θ β θ= + − + + .             (24) 
(3) Do not buy in period 1 but buy version II in period 2 with a total value  
2 2 2( ) ( )IBV q ex pθ β θ= + −      (25) 
(4) Stay inactive in both periods and gain VII = 0. 
Therefore the potential market segmentation is also the same as described in Lemma 1. The 
cutoff values for the four segments are 0 1 2, ,θ θ θ  and 3θ as in Figure 2. 
Taking into account the consumers' self-selection behavior, the ISV sets prices p1 and pu 
to maximize his discounted total profit over the two periods:  
  
1 2
1 2 1 2
, ,
2
max ( , , ) ( ) ( )
0, 0, 0, 0,
. .
u
u BU BH u BU IB
p p p
BU BH IB II
u
p p p p x x p x p x
x x x x
s t
p p
βΠ = + + +
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥

≥
.                 (26) 
Solving this optimization problem, there are two possible equilibria.  
(1) When the ratio of the second period quality to the first period quality q2/ q1 is high but still 
satisfies our assumption made at Section 3, the software vendor will charge a higher price p1 in 
period 1 which cannibalizes with those relatively low value consumers who buy in period 1 but 
do not upgrade. Therefore it is optimal for the vendor to price the software products so that those 
medium value consumers have to either buy and upgrade or do not buy the software at either 
period. The resulting market segmentation is (II, BU). The price schedule is 
2
1 1 2 2 1
1
1 2
2 1 2 2 1
2
1 2
2 1 1 2 2 1
1 2
(1 ) ( ) ( (2 4 1) )
2( (1 ) )
( ) ((2 ) )
2( (1 ) )
( )( ) ((2 ) (3 2 ) )
2( (1 ) )
u
q q q e q q
p
q q e
q q q e q q
p
q q e
q q q q e q q
p
q q e
β β β β β
β β
β β
β β
β β β
β β
+ + + − + +
=
+ − +
+ − + −
=
+ − +
− + − + − +
=
+ − +
   (27) 
In this equilibrium, the market segmentation, profit of the vendor and consumer surplus are 
identical to those under the pure leasing strategy. 
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 (2) Another equilibrium exists when the ratio of q2/ q1 is relatively low. Under this equilibrium, 
the software will give up those consumers who wait to buy in period 2 but engage in expanding 
the market share from the first period adopters by lowering the first period selling price p1. The 
resulting market segmentation is (II, BH, BU).  
This equilibrium is characterized by the following 
1 1 2 1 1 2
1 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
2 1 1 2 2 1 1 2 2 1
2 2
1 2 1 2
2 2
1 2 1 2
(1 )( )(2(1 ) ( ) (2 ) ))
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q e q q q e q q
p
e q q q eq
e q q q q q q e q q q q
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q q q e q
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β β β β
β β
β β β β
β β
β β
+ − + − − + −
=
+ + + − −
+ − + + − − + + + −
=
+ + + − −
+ − + +
= 1 2 1 2 1
2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1
2
1 2 1 2
1 2 1 2 1
2
1 2 1 2
1
(3 2 ) ) (1 )(2 )( )
(4 3 ) 4(1 )( ( ) )
0
(2(1 ) (4 3 ) )( )
(4 3 ) 4(1 )( ( ) )
(1 )(2 ( ) (2 ))
(4 3 ) 4(1 )( ( ) )
(1 )(
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BH
BU
s
q e q q q q
e q q q eq
x
q e q q e
x
e q q q eq
q q q e q q
x
e q q q eq
q
β β
β β
β β
β β
β
β β
β
− + − + − −
+ + + − −
=
+ − + − −
=
+ + + − −
+ − − −
=
+ + + − −
+
Π =
2 2
2 1 1 2 1 1 2 2
2
1 2 1 2
( )( ) (1 ) ))
(4 3 ) 4(1 )( ( ) )
q q q q e q q q q
e q q q eq
β β β β
β β
− + − + + −
+ + + − −
 (28) 
Compared with the pure leasing strategy, the vendor can have a greater market share, 
generate more profits and consumers are also better off through the pure selling strategy, as 
shown in the following Figures 4-7. Those medium value consumers who are forced to enter the 
leasing contract have the choice of buying period 1 without the obligation to upgrade in period 2 
under the selling policy. Their cost of using the software is reduced significantly (Figure 6). 
Selling also help those low value consumers who cannot afford the leasing contract to buy 
version 1 software and enjoy using it for both periods. With the increase of market share, the 
network externality effect becomes stronger, enabling the software vendor to charge a higher 
upgrade price to the high value consumers. Therefore high value consumers who always use the 
latest version software product incur a higher total cost. However, the loss of those high value 
consumers is outweighed by the gain of the medium and low value consumers. Consumer 
surplus is increased under the selling policy. 
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Figure 4. Market Segmentation of Selling v.s. Leasing with Externality (The solid curve: leasing; dotted 
curve: selling). 
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Figure 5. Profit comparison with externality (The solid curve: leasing; dotted curve: selling). 
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Figure 6. Cost of Using the Latest Version Software (The long dotted curve: hybrid; solid curve: pure leasing; 
short dotted curve: pure selling). 
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Figure 7. Consumer Surplus Comparison with Externality (The solid curve: leasing; dotted curve: selling). 
This result is very interesting. The leasing policy has been suggested by Coase (1972), 
Bulow (1982) and other researchers as a way to effectively commit on second period prices to 
resolve the time-inconsistent problem. When we re-examine Coase Conjecture for durable good 
software which has a strong network externality effect, we find that leasing is a way of making 
commitment for a durable good monopoly, but its power is restricted when the durable good has 
a strong network effect. Leasing forces consumers to agree with the prices of both periods, which 
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deprives some medium value consumers of the flexibility of buying but not upgrade. Therefore 
leasing strategy forgoes some market share for the ability of committing on second period price. 
Without considering network externality, previous studies about a monopoly durable seller 
claimed that leasing “can achieve all the standard results of a nondurable monopolist” (Bulow 
1982). The above result shows that with the presence of network externality, that statement may 
not hold --- profit under pure leasing strategy may be lower than that of a nondurable 
monopolist. Therefore leasing is a restricted way of making commitment and it addresses the 
time-inconsistent problem at the cost of losing market share and reducing consumer surplus. 
3.3.3 Hybrid 
With network externality, the potential market segmentation for the hybrid case is the 
same as that in the benchmark case in Figure 2. Consumers can choose to enter the lease contract 
and automatic receive product upgrade in period 2 (type L), buy in period 1 and not upgrade in 
period 2 (BH), wait to buy in period 2 (IB) or remain inactive in either period (II). Those 
consumers who lease have a utility function 1 2 0 2( ) ( ) ( ) (1 )L rV q q e x x pθ θ β β β= + + + − + . The utility 
functions of the other three types of consumers are the same as in the pure selling case. 
We solve the maximization problem to find the optimal prices and resulting firm profits. 
, 1 2
, 1 2 1 2
,
max ( , ) ( )
. . 0, 0, 0, 0
r
r r L BH r L IB
p p p
L BH IB II
p p p p x p x p x p x
s t x x x x
βΠ = + + +
≥ ≥ ≥ ≥
. 
The equilibrium under the hybrid policy leads to the same consumer segmentation and vendor 
profit as in the pure selling equilibrium h sΠ =Π . Because the quality is public knowledge to all 
the consumers, the total discounted price charged to lease and buy-and-upgrade customers 
should be the same in order to eliminate an arbitrage opportunity: 1
1
s s
h u
r
p p
p
β
β
+
=
+
. Therefore the 
above comparison and analysis between the selling and leasing policies also apply to this hybrid 
policy, with the replacement of pure selling policy to this hybrid policy.  
 
3.4 Model 4– with externality, No Commitment 
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In the pervious model, we add network externality effect into the monopoly’s 
consideration and show that leasing may not always achieve the monopoly equilibrium for a 
nondurable good seller. Therefore leasing is a restricted way of ameliorating the durable good 
time-inconsistent problem. This sub-section considers the case that when the monopoly cannot 
make a credible commitment on second period price, how the network externality effect can 
affect the licensing policy of the software vendor? 
The equilibrium under the pure leasing policy is the same as in Section 3.3.1. We will 
next solve the equilibria under the pure selling and hybrid policies and compare them with that 
under leasing.  
3.4.1 Pure selling 
Since rational consumers will expect the upgrade price and the price of version II 
software to drop in the second period, the monopoly will have to decide the second period prices 
after consumers’ first period decisions have been made, that is, based on the price and market 
share realized in period 1. We solve this two-stage Stackleberg game with backward induction.  
Consumers’ choices are the same as in Section 3.4.1, so is the potential market 
segmentation (II, IB, BH, BU).  
0 0 2 2 2
1 2 2 2 1 1 1 0 1
2 1 1 0 1 2 1 2 1 2 1
( ) ( | , , )
( | , , ) ( | , , , )
( | , , , ) ( | , , , , , )
II IB
IB BH
BH BU u
V V q x p
V q x p V q x x p
V q x x p V q q x x p p
θ θ
θ θ
θ θ
=
=
=
  (29) 
where 
0 2
1 1
2 1 0
1
1
x
x
x
θ
θ
θ θ
= −
= −
− =
       (30) 
Taking consumers’’ selections into account and given the price of version I software, the 
software vendor maximizes his second-period profit alone to decide on the second period 
upgrade price and the price of the version II software.  
2
2 1 1 0 2 1 2
,
0 1 2
2
max '( , | ) ( ) ( )
0
. .
u
u u
p p
u
p p p x x p x x p
x x x
s t
p p
Π = − + −
≤ ≤ ≤

≥
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After determining the optimal second period prices, the vendor continues to find the optimal first 
period selling price. 
1
1 1 1
1
max ( ) '
. . 0
p
p x p
s t x
βΠ = + Π
≥
. 
The prices directly affect consumers’ adoption decision, and then affect market share. 
The market share of the software product increases network externality effect, which also affects 
consumers’ utility. Therefore there exists a complicated relationship between the prices and 
market segmentations, which is described by the simultaneous equations (29) and (30). Since 
those market share vector (x1, x0, x2) has a one-to-one mapping to the price vector (p1, pu, p2), 
determining the market shares is equivalent to determining the prices.  Hence we can convert the 
decision variables in the constrained optimization problem from price variables into the demand 
variables: the market shares of first period adopters, second period non-upgraders, and total 
market share in the second period.  
When the vendor cannot commit on high prices in the second period, some medium and 
low value consumers will take the leapfrog strategy: they wait to buy in the second period when 
the installed base has been built up and they can benefit from both the network effect and the 
lower price. In market equilibrium, consumers strictly prefer leapfrogging to buying and holding. 
Therefore the market segmentation is (BU, IB, II).  
When the intensity of the network effect e is small, the equilibrium price schedules and 
market shares are 
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 When the intensity of externality e is large, the vendor has a greater incentive to charge a 
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higher selling price towards the second version software. In that case, the condition that prevents 
consumers from hiding their previous purchasing history and buying second period software 
instead of upgrading --- 2 up p≥  is binding. The equilibrium is characterized by  
2
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Compared with the equilibrium under the leasing policy, the vendor gains a lower profit 
when he cannot commit on future prices but consumers are better off form the choices and lower 
prices.  
3.4.2 Hybrid 
 If the vendor chooses to both sell and lease the software product, he can commit on the 
second period upgrade price but still leave the option of leapfrog to the lower value consumers. 
The equilibrium market segmentation is (L, IB, II). Similar to the game present in 3.4.1, the 
vendor decide the second period selling price taking the leasing price and first period selling 
price as given.  
2
2 1 1 0 2 1 2
0 1 2
max '( | , ) ( ) ( )
. . 0
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p p p x x p x x p
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Π = − + −
≤ ≤ ≤
 
After determining the optimal second period price, the vendor seeks the optimal first period 
selling price by maximizing the total discounted profit 
1
1 1 0 0 1
,
0 1
max ( , ) ( ) '
. . 0
r
r r
p p
p p x x p x p
s t x x
βΠ = − + + Π
≤ ≤
. 
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 To reduce the complexity of the problem, we transform the decision variables to market 
demand variables. The equilibrium market share and prices are: 
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 We use numerical examples to show the comparison among the three licensing policies 
(Figures 8-12). We can see leasing is still a dominating strategy among the three: the software 
vendor gains the highest profit under pure leasing and pure selling generates the lowest profits. 
Network externality increases consumer utility and thereby their willingness-to-pay. However, 
the software vendor needs to be able to commit on future prices in order to reap the benefit 
created by the network effect. When consumers expect the vendor to lower price in period 2, 
they will take advantage of the leapfrog choice available under the selling policy. This choice 
hurts the vendor’s profit but benefit the consumers. Under the hybrid policy, the constraint that 
upgrade price cannot exceed price of second version software is eliminated, therefore the profit 
of hybrid equilibrium falls in-between profits of leasing and selling. 
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Figure 8. Profit comparison with externality and without commitment (The solid curve: pure leasing; long 
dotted curve: hybrid; short dotted curve: pure selling). 
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Figure 9. Market segmentations with externality and without commitment (The solid curve: pure leasing; 
long dotted curve: hybrid; short dotted curve: pure selling). 
 30 
0 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
e
0.6
0.8
1
1.2
1.4
1.6
t
s
o
C
cost of high-end users -- No committment , with externality ,b=.8,q1=1,q2=1.8
 
Figure 10. Cost of Using the Latest Version Software (The solid curve: pure leasing; short dotted curve: pure 
selling; long dotted curve: hybrid). 
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Figure 11. Consumer surplus comparison with externality and without commitment (The solid curve: pure 
leasing; long dotted curve: hybrid; short dotted curve: pure selling). 
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Figure 12. Social welfare comparison with externality and without commitment (The solid curve: pure 
leasing; long dotted curve: hybrid; short dotted curve: pure selling). 
 
4 Conclusions 
 
When software vendors can use the web to deliver software as a service based on a 
subscription model, we investigate whether web-based leases will become the dominant way of 
licensing software, as predicated by the “Coase conjecture” in traditional durable good market. 
We discuss leasing and selling software in a monopolist context, trying to explain the motivation 
for different strategies when there exists network externality effect. This paper identifies the 
costs and benefits of the software selling and leasing policies to both the vendors and the 
consumers considering the market dynamics, network externality and the ability of the 
monopolist’s ability to commit.  
This project provides insights to them to facilitate their decision-making.  
(1) Provide insights to Software Vendors (SVs);  
Based on this study, we recommend the optimal strategy to software vendors to improve their 
products and profits. Whether to choose a pure selling or leasing policy or a hybrid one depends 
on a number of factors to be identified in this project: 
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• Degree and variance of quality improvement: high expectation or variance of quality 
improvement between software generations will increase the cannibalization of market shares 
of different generations of software. Therefore the time-inconsistent problem of selling a less 
appealing strategy to software vendors. On the other hand, a software vendor can control the 
quality improvement of new versions by controlling R&D investments and time-to-market of 
the new product. 
• Intensity of network externality: a strong network effect will increase the consumers’ value 
in using the product and therefore increase market share. As analyzed in the last section, 
when network externality is large enough, software vendors will be more willing to invest in 
market share and adopt the selling policy. As a result, contrary to the Coase conjecture, 
leasing may not always be a dominant licensing policy for software vendors. At the same 
time, software vendors can increase their long-term profit besides market share by building a 
strong network externality of their product. 
• The trade-offs between ability to make commitment and the market share: we identify that 
leasing adds a restriction on the vendor’s ability to enlarge market share in the first period for 
the benefit of committing on future prices. If the software vendor is able to commit on future 
prices with other strategies, then a selling or hybrid strategy may be preferred than leasing. 
 
(2) Provide insights to consumers:  
This paper helps consumers realize the benefits and costs of each of the licensing policies 
and help them make the best decision taking into account their own characteristics, product 
upgrades, and network effects. The analysis of consumer surplus and social welfare will also 
give implication to policy makers.  
 
(3) Contribute to the academic research field: 
Software is different from conventional durable goods because of the low marginal 
production cost, network externality in its distribution, easy to upgrade and strict Intellectual 
Property protection. Thus, the Coase Conjecture discussed in the durable goods literature does 
not apply to the software distribution strategy. Our paper fills in this gap by developing a model 
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combining vertical differentiation and intertemporal price discrimination. Using the model, we 
find a market segmentation strategy for a software vendor to classify consumers by their quality 
preferences through different selling strategies.  
By examining the differences in strategies regarding software and other durable products, 
this project can contribute to the literature of durable goods research. It extends the current 
models with new features of network externality and compatibility, which have not been fully 
considered into models due to technology unavailability or model intractability. We find that the 
leasing can help the monopoly selling commit on a high future price, but unlike proved in the 
previous studies for durable goods without network externality, leasing may not be able to 
achieve the monopoly profit as a nondurable seller can do over time. Therefore leasing is a 
restrict tool of making commitment at the cost of market share, consumer surplus and potentially 
firm profit. The results provide theoretical support for researchers in economics, marketing and 
technology management to better understand the licensing policies and impact on consumers and 
social welfare. 
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